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Abstract:
Cultural work attracts much sociological interest and is often seen as 
typifying “precarity”. However, this scholarship rarely examines how 
“placemaking” policy interventions affect the concrete conditions of 
cultural work. We study a major recent public/private policy intervention 
in the United Kingdom: Hull City of Culture 2017. This intervention 
embodied a multifaceted set of policy logics; combining the desire to 
boost arts participation, with a market-facing imperative to bolster the 
city’s “brand”. We examine what happened to the city’s “cultural 
projectariat” (meaning those workers whose career depends on 
assembling sequences of discrete, time-limited funded cultural projects) 
during this event. The influx of funds created opportunities for good 
quality work, but specific sources of insecurity persisted and in certain 
respects intensified: including the need for significant unpaid work, and 
permanent competition for resources. City of Culture’s nature as a 
market-oriented “placemaking” intervention limits its capacity to 
ameliorate the conditions of cultural work, which has to be conceived as 
a policy end in itself if conditions of the cultural projectariat are to be 
improved. 
 
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/CNC
Capital & Class
For Peer Review
Table 1
Informant Role
Sector Support 1 Director of national arts sector support 
organisation.
Council 1 Official at Hull City Council
Theatre 1 Leader of Hull-based theatre organisation
Theatre 2 Leader of Hull-based theatre organisation*
Theatre 3 Leader of Hull-based theatre organisation*
Theatre 4 Leader of Hull-based theatre organisation*
ArtsOrg 1 Hull-based multimedia artist*
ArtsOrg 2 Hull-based visual artist*
ArtsOrg 3 Leader of Hull-based arts organization
ArtsOrg 4 Hull-based multimedia artist*
ArtsOrg 5 Hull-based multimedia artist1*
Funder 1 Official at regional funding organisation
Funder 2 Official at regional funding organisation
Employer 1 Director of national-level cultural sector 
employer organisation
Employer 2 Regional representative for cultural sector 
employer organisation; concurrently leader at 
reagional theatre organization*
Union 1 Regional representative for cultural sector trade 
union
Delivery 1 Former worker at delivery organisation; 
concurrently leader of Hull-based music 
organization*
Delivery 2 Former worker at delivery organisation
Delivery 3 Senior staff at delivery/legacy organisation
Delivery partner 1 Senior administrator at major delivery partner
1 Artists 4 and 5 were interviewed jointly
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Creative placemaking and the cultural projectariat: artistic work in the wake of Hull City of Culture 
2017
Abstract
Cultural work attracts much sociological interest and is often seen as typifying “precarity”. However, 
this scholarship rarely examines how “placemaking” policy interventions affect the concrete 
conditions of cultural work. We study a major recent public/private policy intervention in the United 
Kingdom: Hull City of Culture 2017. This intervention embodied a multifaceted set of policy logics; 
combining the desire to boost arts participation, with a market-facing imperative to bolster the city’s 
“brand”. We examine what happened to the city’s “cultural projectariat” (meaning those workers 
whose career depends on assembling sequences of discrete, time-limited funded cultural projects) 
during this event. The influx of funds created opportunities for good quality work, but specific sources 
of insecurity persisted and in certain respects intensified: including the need for significant unpaid 
work, and permanent competition for resources. City of Culture’s nature as a market-oriented 
“placemaking” intervention limits its capacity to ameliorate the conditions of cultural work, which has 
to be conceived as a policy end in itself if conditions of the cultural projectariat are to be improved. 
Introduction
Cultural work is often precarious (Celik and Erkuz Ozturk, 2016; Oakley, 2014; Ross, 2008; Shorthose 
and Graham, 2004; Teipen, 2008; Umney and Kretsos, 2015). More specifically, many cultural workers 
can be seen as part of a “projectariat” (Greer et al, 2019). In other words, their employment is 
contingent on recurrently obtaining funding in order to assemble sequences of time-limited projects, 
access to which may be highly competitive- as in a “portfolio career” (Gill, 2002; Shorthose and 
Graham, 2004). By now it is commonplace for researchers to comment on the precariousness of 
cultural work. However, it is much more unusual to find scholarship situating this problem in a policy 
context, and examining how particular interventions may lead to variations in the organizational 
landscape facing the “cultural projectariat”. That is the purpose of this article.
The cultural projectariat, while often insecure and poorly-remunerated, is important to many regions’ 
developmental strategies. Cities compete for visitors and investment, and may centralise the vibrancy 
of their cultural scenes as a means of achieving this (Baum, 2018; Hewison, 2014; Nicodemus, 2013). 
The UK “City of Culture” (CoC) scheme is a highly developed expression of this strategy. Cities compete 
to be awarded CoC status, which unlocks public and private funding with the brief of staging a year-
long programme of cultural events. The most recent UK CoC is Hull 2017; a deprived city and 
historically a cultural “cold spot”, but which has explicitly integrated culture into its developmental 
strategy. Only a small number of recent studies have recognised the importance of examining the 
relationship between policy attempts to stimulate “creative cities” and concrete outcomes for 
workers, which otherwise remains largely unexamined (e.g. Baum, 2018). 
The UK CoC scheme (or its EU-wide “Capital of Culture” inspiration) is an important example of a policy 
initiative designed to bolster local urban creative economies. CoC has often been critiqued as a 
market-focused “rebranding” initiative with limited benefit for local cultural workers (Mooney, 2004; 
Wharton et al, 2010). In studying Hull 2017, we ask whether the influx of CoC resources mitigated the 
precariousness of cultural project work. We address this question through key informant interviews 
with funding and policy actors, arts organisations, and other relevant parties. Hull 2017 did create 
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significant new opportunities for good-quality project work. It enabled certain cultural workers to gain 
new career security, and evidently stimulated greater “confidence” to participate in arts and cultural 
activity among many of the city’s residents. However, two specific sources of insecurity, acting 
especially on what we will identify as a “middle layer” of cultural project workers, persisted and in 
certain respects exacerbated: the intensity of competition for project resources, and the need for 
extensive and risk-laden unpaid labour. The competing pressures acting on CoC as an intervention, 
most notably but not exclusively its market-facing impetus (i.e. the need to “rebrand” Hull as a 
destination for visitors and investors) present obstacles to addressing these problems. 
We begin by reviewing literature on the sociology of cultural work, setting it alongside policy-focused 
analyses of “placemaking” interventions like CoC. We argue there have been insufficient links drawn 
between these literatures- particularly regarding the causal relationships between policy initiatives 
and cultural working conditions. After explaining our research methods, our empirical evidence is 
presented. We examine the processes through which Hull 2017 funding was disbursed, and consider 
how these processes were experienced by arts organisations. In contrast to preceding studies of 
cultural work, we place great emphasis on examining the evolution of this organisational fabric as a 
prerequisite for understanding working conditions. Then, we reflect on the opportunities and 
challenges they presented for the cultural projectariat in Hull, considering our findings’ implications 
for future scholarship. 
The cultural projectariat
We use “projectariat” as a more specific relative to “precarity” and “the precariat”, which are 
problematically broad (Alberti et al, 2018; Manolchev et al, 2018). By it, we mean workers who are 
“precarious” insofar as their careers are contingent upon successfully accruing sequences of discrete, 
time-limited funded projects for which they have to continually compete (Greer et al, 2019). This 
means their working lives are highly fluid, and dependent on assembling “portfolios” of disparate jobs 
in a context characterised by general “mass underemployment” (Shorthose and Graham, 2004). While 
authors, particularly in Capital and Class, have considered how the pressures of this context may 
disrupt or override the communitarian and self-determined creative activity often found in locally 
embedded arts “scenes” (e.g. Miles, 2004; Shorthose, 2004), the focus here is slightly shifted, towards 
the conditions of cultural work as a form of paid activity. What dynamics shape the material 
experience of trying to make a living in the “cultural projectariat”, in the context of a local “creative 
ecology” (Shorthose and Graham, 2004) which is being radically remoulded by a high-profile 
developmental policy intervention?
Projectariat careers are endemic in arts and culture- i.e. the fields of theatre, music, literature, dance, 
and visual arts. Holden (2016) divides this sector into publicly-funded culture (non-profits delivering 
ostensibly more “challenging” or community-oriented work funded by public money); commercial 
culture (market-oriented productions relying on paying audiences); and home-made culture (“the 
post-modern garage punk band and the YouTube upload” [Holden, 2016:449]).
There is a projectariat in public and commercial culture insofar as work in both depends on accessing 
project-specific funds. It is the gatekeeper that varies: for instance, disbursers of public funds, such as 
Arts Council England (ACE), versus a for-profit investor supporting a commercial show. This emphasis 
on the project means a culture of short-termism with regard to working conditions that pervades 
public and commercial domains across various “creative” sectors including the performing arts 
(Nordicity and Smith, 2017) and video games design (Teipen, 2008).
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Approaching cultural work as a form of project work raises new questions. In general terms, the 
“precariousness” of cultural work is well established. There are widely-observed problems of low or 
unpaid work (Baum, 2018; Greer et al, 2018; Nordicity and Smith, 2017; Umney, 2016) exacerbated 
by labour oversupply (Shortose and Graham, 2004); risk-laden and unpredictable portfolio careers 
(Gill, 2002; Murray and Gollmitzer, 2012; Teipen, 2008); and reliance on insider contact networks 
(Blair, 2001; Umney and Kretsos, 2015). It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a general 
overview of this literature. Important to note, however, that there continues to be a gap in our 
understanding of how cultural working conditions are moulded by policy context. Some limited 
literature examines how different welfare state regimes affect the experience of being a cultural 
worker (Greer et al, 2018; Murray and Gollmitzer, 2012; Umney, 2016). Others consider the impact of 
collective bargaining institutions in a context of competition for investment (Choko and Connor, 2017; 
Coles, 2016). These disparate studies notwithstanding, numerous authors have commented on an 
enduring analytical gap between cultural policy and cultural work (e.g. Banks and Hesmondhalgh, 
2009; Baum, 2018; Murray and Gollmitzer, 2012). 
By focusing on cultural work as project work, we can shed new light on this gap, because project work 
raises problems the extent of which, we will show, is sensitive to targeted policy interventions such as 
Hull 2017. In particular, there are two concerns about cultural project work which are explored in our 
data. One specific source of insecurity in project-based work is the dynamics of competition. 
Competition is not simply to get a foot on the career ladder, but becomes a permanent feature 
because new projects are continually needed to ensure continuity of income (Gill, 2002; Greer et al, 
2019). A second is the well-documented question of unpaid work, which also assumes particular forms 
for project workers. As we demonstrate, the process of continually applying for new funding 
necessitates recurrent periods of unremunerated labour. Moreover, rather than a “labour of love”, 
much of this unpaid work is particularly troublesome and “high-risk” because it is geared towards 
meeting funder-imposed requirements and is often in vain if a bid is rejected.
What can extant research on project-based organization tell us about precariousness in cultural work? 
Importantly, recent comparative research in social services (Greer et al, 2019; Schulte et al, 2018) 
indicates the problems with viewing the projectariat as inevitably and inherently precarious. Instead, 
they show the wide variability of the insecurity of project-based work. Organizational literature 
identifies various reasons why certain forms of project organization may be more “precarious” than 
others. Variables which have been influentially suggested include the nature of the task (some being 
inherently more “risky” than others) (e.g. Grabher, 2004; Whitley, 2006); designated timeframes 
(Bakker et al, 2016; Karmowska et al, 2017); and institutional context (Christopherson, 2002). In the 
latter case, there is some evidence that specifically “creative” work may always assume a flexible 
model that transcends variations in national institutional configurations (Teipen, 2008). However, 
Greer et al (2019) show how the precariousness of project work can vary widely even when these 
factors are held relatively constant. 
Instead, Greer et al (2019) direct attention towards the network of qualitative relationships between 
funder and fundee that shape the landscape of project-based work at local level. They present these 
relationships as a determining factor on the extent of “projectarian” insecurity in a given case. For 
instance, do funders seek to stimulate competition for project funding and facilitate the entry of new 
actors, or do they prioritise existing networks? (see also Jantz et al [2015]). Do they impose criteria on 
which to evaluate funding awards, or allow project workers to design their own tasks? These questions 
shape the de facto precariousness of project work even where the nature of tasks and formal 
timeframes are similar. Moreover, decisions made in dispersing resources, and the networks used in 
doing so, can determine “winners” and “losers” in funding ecologies. The former, for instance, are 
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those whose established relationships with funders enable them to regularly receive funds, and thus, 
in turn, become sources upon whom others rely for work. Hence, managerial actors at regularly-
funded organisations, while themselves dependent on that funding’s continuation, may gain the 
power to allocate opportunities between other contingent workers on a short-term basis (Samaluk, 
2017). 
We argue here that this is a particularly useful frame to apply to analysing the relationship between 
“creative cities”-oriented policy interventions (Baum, 2018) and cultural work. This is because cultural 
policy interventions are so often characterised by particularly large gaps between the “official” 
objectives that policymakers themselves try to “engineer”, and established practices within those 
scenes themselves; a point well-examined in this journal several years ago (e.g. Miles, 2004; 
Shorthose, 2004) which is now in need of revisiting. As shown in the next section, CoC schemes have 
indeed been repeatedly subjected to these accusations. To understand whether and how these 
interventions can make a difference to the cultural projectariat, case studies are needed which look 
in detail at the way public and private funders, fundees, and a range of different intermediaries, 
interact in concrete local situations. 
To this end, we examine a specific intervention- Hull 2017- which channelled both public and private 
funding. Workers and organisations habituated to both contexts were hoping to access its resources 
and in this sense it transcended Holden’s (2016) typology. Note that Holden’s “home-made culture” 
is also relevant to this study insofar as its creators were occasionally also able to receive CoC funds. 
There is currently little scholarship examining the causal links between policy context and the 
conditions of project-based cultural work. The latter is, justifiably, assumed to be precarious, but the 
mitigation or exacerbation of precariousness by particular policy interventions is rarely investigated. 
Looking at a UK local government context is likely to provide a stimulating case study. Macroeconomic 
policy decisions (i.e. austerity), which are particularly fierce at local level, have intensified the 
insecurity of arts workers (Fanthome, 2018), as they have workers in general (Umney et al, 2018). In 
the UK, arts organisations are being pushed by government to diversify their income streams (DCMS, 
2017), and in this sense have to conceive themselves in more risk-embracing and “entrepreneurial” 
ways (Lorey, 2006; Oakley, 2014); local governments have increasingly been required to encourage 
their regional arts organizations in this direction. Hence there are good reasons to believe that what 
local policymakers do has an impact on local cultural organizational infrastructures, and by extension 
on the relative insecurity of cultural work. However, there are very few case studies detailing this 
articulation with reference to specific local interventions. 
In Hull, CoC has meant that, against a national backdrop of austerity, there has been a sudden influx 
of funding concentrated mainly (but not exclusively) on a programme delivered throughout the 
calendar year 2017. Hull had to rapidly develop an infrastructure for dispersing these resources, and 
formulate a strategy for the investment’s “legacy”. This rapidly and significantly reshaped 
relationships between local funding organisations and the city’s cultural projectariat. While some 
insecurity is inherent in cultural project-work, we ask whether this new infrastructure created 
opportunities for good quality work which mitigated the problems of perpetual competition and high-
risk unpaid labour. In the next section we discuss in more depth the nature of CoC as an intervention. 
Policy and placemaking
Shorthose and Graham (2004; see also Miles, 2004) identified tensions in cultural policy interventions, 
contrasting attempts to engineer cultural development from above in a manner subordinated to the 
goals of capital, with the self-determined and communitarian activity which permeates existing 
networks of artistic workers. Certainly, the goals of CoC may conflict with the priorities of those “on 
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the ground”, as will be shown below. However, even on its own terms, CoC is a fusion of various policy 
logics. Social and artistic goals are explicitly stated: certainly in Hull, the desire to expand community 
engagement in culture, and to establish the city as a venue for elite exhibitions and performances, 
feature prominently (University of Hull, 2018). However, these goals sit alongside a more market-
oriented agenda which can be termed “placemaking”. This phenomena is weakly understood among 
sociologists of work but provides critical context for analysing precarious cultural project work.
Placemaking is used in urban and cultural policy literature to denote the idea of “putting a city on the 
map”. It assigns arts and culture a central role in generating “instrumental value to non-arts 
stakeholders”, particularly by fostering a sense of “vibrancy” that bolsters wider economic activity and 
investment (Nicodemus, 2013:214). Artists are thus expected to embed themselves in an overarching 
project of city renovation and “rebranding” (Garcia, 2005; Scott, 2006). Hence placemaking strategies 
epitomise the longer-running “instrumentalisation” of arts and culture as tools for advancing 
economic development strategy (Hewison, 2014; Belfiore, 2012; Miles, 2004) which in the UK has also 
reoriented national actors like the Arts Councils (Brighton, 2006). They reflect the wider need for post-
industrial cities to compete against each other for highly mobile capital and, supposedly, the favour 
of a cosmopolitan and wealth-generating “creative class” (Florida, 2005). This policy outlook has been 
critiqued as relatively superficial, gentrifying certain districts while exacerbating existing structural 
inequalities (Baum, 2018; Scott, 2006). While this urban planning debate is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the market-oriented component of placemaking schemes, we will argue, also limits the extent 
to which they can improve the conditions of cultural work itself. 
Placemaking initiatives take various forms, including public art commissions (Hewison, 2014), flagship 
infrastructural projects (Miles, 2005), or more nebulous concepts like the designation of “cultural 
quarters” and “creative clusters” (Gu and O’Connor, 2010; Miles, 2004; Montgomery, 2004). CoC is a 
particularly developed expression of placemaking. The UK CoC programme was announced in 2009 to 
emulate the European-wide Capital of Culture initiative, whose British recipients had included 
Glasgow (1990) and Liverpool (2008). The first UK CoC was Derry in 2013, with Hull 2017 the second. 
Cities compete to be named CoC, which unlocks investment from a range of sources including local 
and central government, the Arts Councils and Lottery, and potentially large volumes of corporate 
sponsorship and philanthropic contributions. These funds are used to stage a year-long programme 
of cultural activities. 
Scholarship on placemaking interventions has often emphasised the distance between policy 
intention and concrete experience “on the ground” (Jayne, 2004; McCann, 2002); what Shorthose 
(2004) alludes to by distinguishing between the “engineered” versus “the vernacular”. Scott (2006:15), 
for instance, critiques the desire to “import” a thriving creative scene through policy schemes without 
first fostering “a wider concern for conviviality and camaraderie” in a city. 
This theme is also pronounced in studies of CoC interventions, of which there are numerous in cultural 
and urban policy research but significantly fewer among sociologists of cultural work. Mooney’s (2004) 
study of Glasgow 1990 argued that CoC could do little but put a market-friendly gloss on the city’s 
structural problems, in the naïve hope that rehabilitating the city’s image would be enough. This view 
has been influential: indeed O’Brien and Miles (2010) see it as predominating in critical academic 
literature on the subject. Wharton et al (2010) view the European CoC process as driven mainly by 
business interests. Campbell’s (2011) study of Liverpool 2008 finds general warm feeling about the 
city’s improved image, but little sense that work prospects for the city’s cultural projectariat had been 
substantially improved. Below we offer a view which is more guardedly optimistic and which highlights 
ways in which “engineered” interventions can give voice to autonomous activity within an arts 
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community. However, when viewed from the perspective of working conditions, we still need to 
situate CoC’s impact within important limits.
Hull’s CoC status was announced in 2013. Hull is a comparatively small coastal city of around 250000 
people. It has historically had strong shipping, fishing and ports industries but in a context of post-
industrial decline has become one of the country’s most deprived local authorities (University of Hull, 
2018). Its poverty levels and relative geographical isolation mean it has often been negatively 
stereotyped in public perception (Corcoran, 2017). While all participants testified to the city’s 
innovative arts scene, it has generally been considered a cultural “cold spot” in comparison to larger 
and wealthier Northern cities like Leeds and Manchester. However, CoC was the culmination of the 
City Council’s decision, in 2013, that a core development priority should be using its cultural sector to 
revitalise the city’s image as a place to live and work.
At time of writing Hull 2017 has only recently ended, so our study cannot offer a verdict on its socio-
economic legacy. To date, the Cultural Transformations report (University of Hull, 2018) is the main 
evaluation output. The report highlights various positive findings around metrics like audience 
engagement: for instance spikes in cultural ticket sales, and widespread (90%) “engagement with 
cultural activities” in a survey of Hull residents. It reveals more ambivalent data relating to arts 
workers’ and organisations’ experiences: in some cases they reported intensified competition for 
scarce resources, and expressed reservations over the delivery organisation’s role as gatekeeper to 
funds. Given the recentness of the intervention, we explore these issues through an in-depth 
qualitative study of the work involved in delivering Hull 2017, while events are still fresh in the minds 
of key participants: how did the CoC intervention affect the work landscape for Hull’s cultural 
projectariat? 
Methods
We offer a qualitative examination of the way funds were dispersed during Hull 2017 and how this 
altered the city’s arts infrastructure. In doing so, we can better understand the context facing Hull’s 
cultural projectariat: how their prospects were affected by the influx of funds, and the limits to this 
impact. This requires a focus on detail, and responsiveness to the complex changes that continued 
throughout data gathering (January-October 2018), as the programme transitioned from delivery to 
“legacy”. Hence rather than canvassing a sample of views from one particular type of actor, we sought 
to gather the testimony of well-placed actors occupying key nodes in the local arts and cultural 
environment. This meant a key informant approach to sampling, prioritising specialised knowledge 
provided by people with unique practitioner insight into a highly specific situation. 
We gathered interviews with 21 respondents, each of whom was well-placed to provide detailed 
insights into what is happening in Hull. This included interviewees from within the delivery 
organisation, local government, actors from employer/worker representative organisations, alongside 
respondents from arts organisations. In the last-mentioned case, interviewees usually had multi-
faceted roles. Since many arts organisations (particularly in Hull) are small, with people often taking 
on both administrative and creative functions out of necessity, our respondents tended to have insight 
into the bureaucratic mechanics of Hull 2017 delivery as well as its impact on the experience of cultural 
workers. These organisational-level respondents were often part of the “projectariat”, insofar as they 
were all dependent on winning project-based funding to continue their careers even where they also 
had managerial roles in their companies. As we will show, the de facto level of insecurity they 
experienced varied widely. Participants marked with an asterisk in table one are those who fell into 
this category. Participants without an asterisk were those who, because they were managerial or 
administrative cadres in other types of organisation (such as public funding bodies or permanent 
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sectoral support structures), could not themselves be considered part of the projectariat. Instead, they 
employed, represented, or directed funds towards, project-based cultural workers. Hence while ten 
participants were able to speak directly of their own experience in the projectariat, the main focus of 
the research was understanding the organisational mechanics influencing cultural work rather than 
canvassing people in this situation as widely as possible.
Table one is deliberately broad in describing participants, refraining from specifying length of service, 
specific roles, or any specific description of their organisations. We also use generic words like “leader” 
to account for varied and complex roles (which, as noted, typically combine administrative and 
creative functions). In all cases respondents were either the sole, or one of the key individuals, 
responsible for obtaining funds and overseeing projects. This lack of specificity is because of the 
smallness of Hull’s cultural scene. Even slight clues, such as length of time in the city, or more specific 
organisational description, would enable deduction of identities by someone who knows the Hull arts 
scene well. At certain points we use anonymous citations: this is because the specific nature of the 
data reported, combined with even a generic participant code, would risk revealing identities. This 
matters because we will relate conflicting views about Hull 2017, and it is imperative to us not to 
jeopardise our participants’ relationships with those around them.
INSERT TABLE ONE
We conceived our interview strategy as tracing a causal trail across three stages: firstly, deciphering 
the specific interventions through which funds were dispersed during Hull 2017, and the key priorities 
driving them. Secondly, examining how organisations experienced and responded to these 
interventions. Thirdly, considering how these changes directly affected project-based work. To what 
extent did the new funding infrastructure create a context in which the problems of perpetual 
competition and risk-laden unpaid work could be improved? Questions were adapted as our 
understanding of the context developed, and in response to different interviewee roles. They included 
both ice-breaking general queries (e.g. “Describe your role in the CoC programme”; “How do you feel 
participation in CoC affected your career?”) to highly specific ones (e.g. “what kind of guideline pay 
rates were imposed as a condition of your project funding?”; “what measures did you take to 
encourage a wider applicant pool to your funding schemes?”). 
Sampling used desk research followed by cold contact. Through a preliminary reading of available 
documentation (strategy documents, news reports, programme details) we identified the 
organisations and individuals involved in the delivery of the programme. We approached them over 
phone, post, or email. In some cases existing interviewees directly introduced us to other key 
informants who had been difficult to access. We used our knowledge as industrial relations 
researchers to identify relevant unions and employers’ associations. Most interviews lasted 
approximately an hour. The shortest is 30 minutes and the longest is two hours. 
Analysis used thematic coding of full interview transcriptions. By the final interviews, no new codes 
were emerging and instead we were corroborating and reinforcing existing themes. We took this to 
indicate data saturation. Next, we present this data in three stages: an overview of the general CoC 
delivery infrastructure in Hull; examining how arts organisations interacted with this infrastructure; 
and reflecting on how these developments affected cultural projectariat work. 
Hull 2017
We begin with a relatively detailed overview of the organizational infrastructure in the Hull arts 
ecology, and how it was reshaped during CoC 2017. This, we argue, provides vital context for 
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understanding the concrete changes to the relative (in)security of the city’s cultural projectariat 
described below. 
CoC is awarded to cities where the Council is perceived to be serious about centralising arts and 
culture-led development, but where there is not yet a sufficiently-developed cultural infrastructure to 
realise this (Funder 1). Hull made this commitment in its 2013 strategic plan. It is unusual, compared 
to most UK councils, in maintaining a dedicated arts office with four staff and an annual spending pot 
of £40000 (Council 1, Funder 2). It is also relatively distinctive in retaining direct Council control over 
some key institutions including several museums and the flagship New Theatre (Council 1). However, 
the city has also been a cultural “cold spot” in terms of audience size and depth of provision. One 
participant (ArtsOrg 3) describes culture in Hull as innovative but unstable: 
“Hull… [has] places which have often opened and closed, things have collapsed, people have 
lost their jobs, but I would argue created a slightly more dynamic scene but also a more fragile 
scene. So amazing things have happened and then people have left elsewhere, because 
there’s no sustaining.”
Hull is a comparatively poor city, and spending pressures have led to several independent local cultural 
organisations being closed over the last twenty years (ArtsOrg, 3; Council 1). Consequently, despite its 
recent strategic profile, the arts infrastructure has deteriorated, particularly in dance, literature and 
visual arts (Council 1). Even during 2017, major cuts to Hull City College closed full-time degree courses 
in visual arts and dance (Council 1, ArtsOrg 2). However, theatre remains a comparative advantage. 
Hull is home to nationally-regarded theatre institutions including Hull Truck, New Theatre and Middle 
Child. 
An austere national context, combined with Hull’s “cold spot” status, has counterintuitively made Hull 
attractive to some cultural project workers. The low cost of living and working, combined with the 
emergent CoC buzz, had inspired some respondents to move there (Theatre 4; ArtsOrg 4; ArtsOrg 5). 
Others had arrived long before CoC, specifically to find a lower-competition environment in which 
experienced arts workers would stand more chance of winning project funding. “I came back 
deliberately because there was only one theatre company… [Hull] flashed like a beacon”, as 
somewhere to partner with national funders looking to direct resources to under-served areas 
(Theatre 3).
Hull’s first CoC bid was rejected for featuring insufficient input from its independent/non-profit sector, 
instead vaunting its Council-run assets (Council 1). It centralised independent and community 
engagement throughout its second, successful bid. The delivery organisation itself was established as 
an independent actor destined to function as an entirely new Hull cultural institution (Delivery 3). 
After being awarded CoC status, Hull raised £32m from various sources; core funds from the City 
Council and Arts Council England (ACE), which was leveraged to encourage private donations. This 
sum exceeded the initial £18m target, and coincided with additional central government grants to 
refurbish New Theatre and the city’s major art gallery, the Ferens. 
The new delivery organisation therefore had to develop an infrastructure to absorb a sudden spike in 
funding, stage a major year-long festival, while also paying attention to “legacy”. It pursued a mixed 
economy model using various tools (Delivery 3). The need to stage a dense events programme which 
could stand out in terms of quality led to a focus on direct commissioning. Major flagship commissions 
mostly went to organisations outside Hull with a national profile, for example to well-established 
studios with elite producers (Council 1), to deliver large-scale projects that were beyond local 
organisations’ capacity (Employer 2; Delivery partner 1). 
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The delivery organisation also commissioned, or launched co-commissions with, key local 
organisations such as Hull Truck and the producing house Middle Child (Delivery 3). Where this 
happened, organisations were able to unlock significant additional resources due to their association 
with CoC and expand the scope of their work (Theatre 1; Delivery 3). One such company was able to 
enter ACE’s national portfolio (i.e. receive a four-year structural funding settlement) following Hull 
2017. These partnerships were particularly significant in theatre, capitalising on Hull’s existing 
comparative advantages. This, alongside elite national-level commissions, reflects the demands of 
rapidly assembling a dense programme of major cultural events for exhibition on the “national stage”. 
These processes- focused on external commissions and existing local strengths- are in keeping with 
CoC’s placemaking impetus: the need to quickly “rebrand” Hull as a venue for cultural innovation and 
excellence. However, this logic was intertwined with other social policy objectives. In Hull’s case this 
included an emphasis on increasing local communities’ arts participation. The main instrument for this 
was the Creative Communites (CC) scheme. This was a funding pot of £600000 making smaller awards 
(up to £10000) open to any applicants on a competitive basis. Applicants needed to demonstrate plans 
for community engagement, and were encouraged to partner with community groups in Hull (Council 
1, Delivery 2; ArtsOrg 2). 
Initial plans to amalgamate the Council arts unit’s own budget with the delivery organisation’s were 
shelved (Council 1). Hence the Council arts team retained its own long-running brief: to strategically 
support projects which could enhance the depth of quality of the Hull arts scene. Council funds are 
small-scale and discretionary, often concentrated on areas of strategic weakness, and its formalised 
procurement apparatus has been stripped away in recent years (Council 1). Its focus on addressing 
weaknesses contrasts with the delivery organisation’s placemaking focus on comparative advantage; 
a tension we examine below. 
CoC status enabled Hull to buck the national austerity-driven trend of dismantling local arts and 
cultural infrastructure. However, the Hull 2017 situation is exceptional and, importantly, temporary. 
2017 saw large, time-limited spikes in public funding and private sponsorship, in a context where the 
former is being drastically squeezed and the latter is usually “pie in the sky” outside London (Council 
1; Theatre 3). Does Hull 2017 therefore amount to a temporary feast amid inevitable famine for 
cultural workers? Some respondents asked whether expectations had been raised to unsustainable 
levels (ArtsOrg 3; Theatre 1). We reflect on these questions in the following sections.
Successes and tensions at organisational level
Hull 2017 enabled certain local organisations to escape- or substantially mitigate- the “short-termism” 
(Employer 1) and precariousness of cultural project-based work. Importantly, this effect appeared 
strongest in prioritised areas of comparative advantage, particularly theatre. One theatre company’s 
profile was raised to the extent that they gained ACE national portfolio status. This enabled four core 
staff to be given permanent contracts for the first time. However, the performers and technicians 
working on individual shows would remain contingent freelancers (anon). This status also greatly 
reduces the risks inherent in applying for additional resources (Employer 2, Theatre 2). Without long-
term structural funds, cultural workers spend large quantities of unpaid time and effort creating bids 
which are more often than not rejected (Theatre 4; ArtsOrg 1; ArtsOrg 3). Theatre-centred 
infrastructural initiatives were also launched, including a “Made in Hull” Edinburgh Festival showcase, 
and the Hull Independent Producers’ Initiative (which commissioned a celebrated producer to mentor 
young local companies). These developments suggest that, in particular cases, Hull 2017 created 
conditions whereby certain cultural workers could develop their careers and profiles, and even escape 
the cultural “projectariat” entirely (or for at least four years). 
Page 10 of 19
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/CNC
Capital & Class
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
These developments were not exclusive to theatre. Receiving a large CoC commission, for instance, 
enabled one arts organisation to hire resident artists on a year-long contract rather than the typical 
one-off events contracts. Upgrades to the Ferens and the creation of the new Humber Street Gallery 
were also perceived as significant opportunities for Hull-based visual artists to develop their profile 
and exhibit work (ArtsOrg 1; ArtsOrg 2). These, however, are prospects, rather than the more 
demonstrable outcomes described in relation to key theatre institutions (described as “the usual 
suspects” by one interviewee [anon]). In some cases even the smaller-scale CC scheme had a 
transformative impact on cultural workers’ careers. One participant describes using a CC grant to lever 
additional public and private match funding, leading to their CC project developing an international 
profile: a “seismic” career boost (ArtsOrg 1) precipitating more frequent and better-paid jobs. 
These success stories often follow a familiar path. It is common for cultural workers to hope one 
project’s success can produce a “break”; i.e. reduce insecurity by rendering them more in-demand. As 
shown, this goal was realised for some of the Hull projectariat following CoC work. However, the limits 
of these successes need to be understood in the context of some of the tensions that emerged through 
the Hull 2017 process. 
There is a tension between the temporal logic of CoC as a city rebranding initiative, necessitating a 
spectacular and concentrated programme of events, and the long-term requirements of the Hull arts 
infrastructure. One respondent (anon), whose organisation received a CoC commission, argued that 
more benefits would have followed from receiving the same amount staggered over a longer period. 
Some noted that the regularity is more important than the total sum, providing leeway to apply for 
additional resources (ArtsOrg 3) and making it easier to offer work to people (Employer 2). 
The temporal question is also illustrated by divergences between the strategic priorities of the delivery 
organisation and the Council. A Council agent had initially provided a list of ordered priorities for arts 
development in Hull, placing areas of weakness at the top, hoping these could be corrected in the 
interests of depth of quality (anon). In fact, these were inverted: the pressures of implementing the 
2017 programme meant the greater focus was on areas of existing comparative advantage. 
Consequently, our Council interviewee argued that one area of reduced impact was a middle tier of 
arts workers: those with professional skills adequate to realistically compete for project funding, but 
who fell outside commissioning priorities and who were not sufficiently geared towards community 
engagement to win CC applications. The Council was asked to support this tier but had very limited 
funds with which to do so (Council 1). It was from this kind of actor that the most critical comments 
on Hull 2017 emerged. Various respondents (while not always endorsing these views themselves) 
reported encountering dissent from those who, being neither embedded in existing areas of strength, 
nor within community networks, felt shut out by a new gatekeeper (ArtsOrg 1; ArtsOrg 2; Theatre 3).
This critique illustrates the dialectical relationship between professionalism and participation in the 
arts. Professional careers depend on an engaged audience, and vice versa, but when participation 
increases so do the competitive pressures on professionals. This tension frames the recurrent 
argument among interviewees that one of Hull 2017’s major achievements was increasing 
“confidence” in the city. During the CC stream in particular, there was great emphasis on outreach 
work to encourage applicants with no experience of funded arts projects, in some cases providing 
detailed pre-submission advice (Delivery 2). The scheme’s organisers knew that many potential 
participants would not be professional artists and would have varied “exit points”: many would not 
be interested in working in culture long-term (Delivery 2). Consequently, there was scope for creators 
of “home-made culture” (Holden, 2016) to access previously-unobtainable funds, if a community 
engagement aspect could be demonstrated. 
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The participation-competition tension also emerges in the Cultural Transformations data. The report 
highlights a general sense that residents’ pride in the city had increased, but also makes the more 
specific point that artistically-engaged Hull residents are now putting in substantially more 
applications for project funding (University of Hull, 2018). Its survey of arts workers also found that 
70% had been involved in projects made possible by CoC, and 90% had been able to learn new skills 
and try new ideas. However, it also revealed concerns over intensified competition for funding, access 
to venues, and for audiences. We unpack this further in the next section.
In 2018 the delivery organisation was renamed Absolutely Cultured and converted into a permanent 
organisation with a brief to develop the Hull 2017 legacy. It has a reduced budget, and its agenda 
concentrates on certain functions: staging 3-4 major public events annually; maintaining the highly-
visible volunteer corps that handles many crowd direction and stewarding functions at Hull cultural 
events; and overseeing new strategic assets like Humber Street Gallery (Delivery 3). Its work will be 
closely aligned with the Council’s development strategy of expanding the “visitor economy”. 
Consequently, it will also provide branding functions, such as offering tours and travel tips to social 
media “influencers” visiting the area (Delivery 3). Some participants expressed concern with the focus 
on public events, since this could compete with existing events organisations (Council 1) and would 
not provide an ongoing source of employment for the city’s local cultural workforce (ArtsOrg 3). 
Our aim is not to critique specific decisions made during Hull 2017. Rather, it is to highlight tensions 
inherent to the CoC project: between events delivery and strategic investment; between rebranding 
and sustainability; between the participant and the professional. These tensions reflect the complex 
logics embodied in CoC as an intervention: it is an attempt to improve a city’s arts infrastructure, but 
set in a context where market-oriented placemaking demands are a short-term imperative, and in 
which social policy demands are also pressing. In the final section, we reflect on how these tensions 
intensified certain sources of insecurity for the cultural projectariat. 
The cultural projectariat during Hull 2017
Interviewees often reflected that, to understand the variegated impact of Hull 2017, one should 
differentiate between cultural career stages. In other words, we may distinguish between different 
“fractions” within the projectariat. One (Theatre 2) expressed this as a three-stage model: first, a stage 
with negligible professional work but potentially with aspirations to progress beyond hobbyist status; 
second, a middle stage where artists can construct a viable but precarious career aggregating one-off 
project awards (i.e. the projectariat proper); third, where workers can be continually employed by an 
arts organisation. The previous sections suggest some propositions. The comparative advantage-
focused commissioning strategy enabled a small number of workers, notably in theatre, to progress 
from the second to the third stage. Greater community engagement accelerated participation at the 
first stage and created expectations that new people could “graduate” to the second. This intensified 
competitive pressures on people established at the second stage. This general picture is elaborated in 
the rest of this section.
CoC’s time-specific nature inevitably limits what can be achieved. Many respondents were worried 
about the post-CoC future. Even at major theatre institutions fixed term contracts were not being 
renewed, and respondents worried that staff were likely to leave the city to pursue work elsewhere 
(anon Theatre). The closure of local arts degree courses may jeopardise Hull’s ability to grow its 
cultural audience (ArtsOrg 3).
We focus on two specific and closely-linked problems facing the cultural projectariat which could not 
be significantly mitigated by Hull 2017, and in some respects have intensified. First, perpetual 
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competition for new projects. Second, the amount of high-risk unpaid work required to sustain a 
project-based career. 
First, enhanced confidence can mean intensified competition, not just for funding, but for audiences 
and venue space. As noted, this was felt most intensely by those at the second “stage” identified 
above. One such respondent reports:
“[It was] a bit unnerving because to begin with as one of the most respected companies in the 
city, we felt a little bit like we were pitching… We produced less work ourselves last year than 
any other year, which is weird, because obviously the market was saturated, there were no 
venues available” (Theatre 3)
This organisation had, therefore, become less secure during 2017. Access to resources decreased 
necessitating pursuit of additional commercial funding: an unpredictable and risk-laden venture given 
the time it requires set against limited chances of success (Sector support 1). This directly affected the 
organisation’s capacity to provide work:
“So at the moment we’re trying to see how we can keep it rolling, whether we can keep it 
rolling, how we can find the finances to do that. So it’s always a scary time, because you 
literally never know. So it’s very difficult to put people on any kind of permanent basis…” 
(Theatre 3) 
Others corroborated the sense of greater competitive pressure on established organisations, but 
offered a different normative interpretation. 
“I think some of the older guard would say that [it’s more competitive]… One of the reasons 
[my organisation] started to struggle a few years ago was basically we used to get all the work. 
And then there was more people around... But why should we have got all the work? It creates 
complacency… if you just hand blank cheques… to the same people who do the same stuff, 
for thirty years… So yeah, it is more competitive, but that means there’s more people engaged, 
more people aware that they can get funds. Whereas a few of the older artists were used to 
just ringing up the arts and development teams and saying ‘hi… I’ve got this idea for a project. 
You know me, I know you’” (ArtsOrg 3)
It is not our intention to evaluate these differing normative views. This is a problem that advocates of 
bottom-up rather than top-down approaches to cultural policy need to wrestle with, since a more 
“vernacular” approach (Shorthose, 2004) does not in itself resolve this tension. For our purposes, we 
simply highlight this as evidence of the specific form taken by the participation-professional dialectic 
during Hull 2017.
This dialectic is also evident in responses to the CC scheme, which is where many potential funding 
recipients were directed seemingly by default (Theatre 3). The community engagement requirement 
shifted the attributes demanded by funders, meaning applicants had to quickly develop new ways of 
framing their work, and build networks with new actors. “We certainly weren’t discouraging practicing 
artists to apply for funding, but if they were it would be a case of where’s the community element in 
this?” (Delivery 2). Developing these relationships can involve extensive unpaid effort with weak 
chance of reward given the competitive nature of the CC pot (Theatre 4; Council 1; ArtsOrg 1; Delivery 
2). Hence competition not only intensified but the terms on which it was conducted also shifted, 
requiring new networks to be constructed, and new ways of framing one’s work had to be quickly 
developed.
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The latter point overlaps with the second problem: high-risk unpaid labour. Note that, in project-based 
cultural work, particularly in the publicly-funded domain, there is often a formal framework for 
regulating pay. In response to concerns around unpaid internships, ACE now requires itemised 
budgets, including labour, directing applicants towards guideline pay rates (Union 1; Funder 1; Funder 
2; Employer 1). Some interviewees had previously had ACE bids knocked back for under-budgeting on 
pay (Theatre 2). In sectors like theatre, there is relatively comprehensive collective bargaining 
coverage over pay, and neither union nor employer respondents testified to major deterioration of, 
or exit from, these arrangements under austerity (Union 1; Employer 1; Employer 2). There is a 
consensus that adhering to agreed contractual pay rates is a signifier of professionalism (Theatre 4; 
Council 1; Employer 1; Employer 2). 
However, these arrangements merely define nominal pay rates and cannot address the various ways 
in which unpaid work seeps into cultural careers. Under austerity, volunteering is becoming more 
important as a route into a career. This is now widely-evidenced in theatre (Nordicity and Smith, 2017; 
Employer 1), and based on our informants’ testimony is likely also true elsewhere in the arts (ArtsOrg 
1; ArtsOrg 4; ArtsOrg 5). Moreover, guideline pay rates and collective bargaining are not well adapted 
to recognising the multiple contingencies that arise during cultural projects (Theatre 2; Theatre 4; 
ArtsOrg 2). One respondent describes an ACE project award made to enable them to contribute to 
Hull 2017, and which features extensive guidance on pay rates:
“But as individuals, you know, we’re all doing far, far more, over and above what we’re getting 
paid. I don’t know how you’d you get around that in the arts… If we really got paid for 
everything we’ve done … one of the things I’ve found is building up strong networks with other 
arts organisations. So I’ve been going to meeting after meeting, none of which I’m getting paid 
for” (ArtsOrg 2)
This interviewee mentioned some comparatively “benign” forms of unpaid labour, such as expending 
additional effort on a labour of love (NB: clearly reliance on volunteering can be problematized, but 
this is beyond the scope of this article). However, we highlight forms of higher-risk unpaid work that 
are specific to the cultural projectariat, and which are an inescapable part of Hull 2017. This is the 
extensive unpaid work that goes into preparing funding bids, which many participants saw as time-
consuming and difficult (ArtsOrg 1; ArtsOrg 3; Theatre 4; Employer 2). This issue was intensified by 
schemes like CC which pushed applicants to engage with community actors, requiring them to build 
new networks often from scratch, and adapt to new ways of framing and reporting on their activities 
(ArtsOrg 1; ArtsOrg 2; Theatre 3; Theatre 4). 
Hull 2017 had a lighter touch approach to monitoring funding awards than ACE, arguing it wanted to 
minimise reporting burdens. Interviews suggested there was a presumption fundees would follow ACE 
guidelines around paying cultural workers. It does not appear that labour costs were addressed 
systematically through competitive schemes such as CC. One recipient (anon ArtsOrg) received a CC 
grant including a small artist’s fee but which did not cover labour costs on the project (which required 
significant manufacturing and maintenance); these costs were only met when this award was matched 
by other funders. Elsewhere, organisations might receive commissions to curate their own stream 
within the wider programme. In this sense they become intermediary dispersers of funds and this 
could be quite informalised. One participant (anon. citation) had been engaged as a freelancer in this 
manner and received a fee they saw as positive given their early career stage, but which certainly fell 
significantly below recognised guidelines as signposted by ACE and relevant unions. The Council arts 
unit itself makes awards based on assessments of strategic need. While they are conscious of the 
problem of low pay, there is no formal or de facto commitment to maintaining established going rates. 
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Arts workers are typically reluctant to police each other’s pay practices (Employer 2; see also Umney 
[2016]). This dovetails with the recurrent perception that, in purely aesthetic terms, regular funding 
for cultural projectarians is a problem. One participant (anon) attributed the liveliness of Hull’s arts 
scene to its insecurity, arguing that organisations in wealthier cities with long-term funding guarantees 
had become “fat… complacent and bland”. Another (anon) described explicitly counselling another 
organisation to avoid employing a resident artist on a permanent contract, viewing this as a threat to 
the impermanence that inspires creative work. While Hull 2017 created numerous opportunities for 
good quality project work, it did not challenge these dynamics in any significant way. Indeed, as we 
have argued, the divergent logics embedded in CoC as a placemaking intervention created tensions 
that crowded out the possibility of addressing them directly.  
Conclusion
CoC 2017 was a major intervention, channelling an influx of funds into a relatively deprived city with 
a fragile but active cultural scene. This influx created new mechanisms through which cultural workers 
could access project work, and some of these projects enabled a sustainable boost to workers’ careers. 
In certain cases it enabled people to entirely escape ‘projectariat’ life, for instance by becoming 
permanent employees of an arts organisation. However, we have also argued that the logics embodied 
in CoC as an intervention- its placemaking impetus and wider social policy objectives- imposed limits 
on the extent to which it could reduce the insecurity of projectariat work, particularly among what we 
have called the professional “middle stage”. In this sense we have sought to greatly flesh out previous 
studies which have interrogated the t nsions between “vernacular” arts scenes and attempts at 
“engineering” developmental cultural interventions from above (Shorthose, 2004; see also Campbell, 
2011; Wharton et al, 2010)
The paper offers two main contributions to existing literature. First, it helps sociologists of work, 
specifically those interested in precarious work in cultural fields, pay closer attention to developments 
at policy level. To date, this is relatively uncommon, and there are only scattered examples of serious 
engagement between policy analysis and the sociology of work (e.g. Baum, 2018; Murray and 
Gollmitzer, 2012). While we examine a highly specific intervention, some general arguments stand 
out, with important implications. First, while problems like competition and unpaid work are well-
recognised, the project-based character of work means these take specific forms and causes. Second, 
while cultural project work is usually “precarious” to some degree, the severity of these problems are 
highly variable and directly influenced by the funding frameworks and policy interventions applied to 
a given context. Third, if cultural project work is to be rendered less insecure this has to be identified 
as an end in itself. Other logics, be they market-oriented (the placemaking impetus) or social 
democratic (the emphasis on community participation), have tended to crowd out the goal of 
providing good quality work for the existing cultural workforce, which did not figure prominently in 
policy-level interviews. 
We also contribute to literature on cultural and urban policy, which has direct interest in CoC initiatives 
(Garcia, 2005; Mooney, 2004; O’Brien and Miles, 2010; Wharton et al, 2010) but which has typically 
remained distant from the sociology of work (Baum, 2018). The causal relationship between policy 
and working conditions is an important gap (Banks and Hesmondhalgh, 2009) which this article has 
addressed through a detailed case study. We hope it provides a useful reference point in considering 
how policy change interacts with the forms and determinants of insecurity. Finally, we contribute to 
literature on project-based organization more generally. Following Greer et al (2019), we show how 
the insecurity of project-based work is shaped by the qualitative relationships between distributors 
and recipients of funding that are embedded in local case studies. 
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A single case study has evident limits. We have not been able to provide an encompassing survey of 
the views of cultural workers in Hull. Instead, we have illuminated the mechanics through which the 
Hull infrastructure was changed during the process, and used this to identify likely consequences with 
corroboration from well-connected informants. We have also been drawn on publicly available 
quantitative evaluation data (University of Hull, 2018) to contextualise these insights. Despite the 
specificity of the Hull case, we have identified propositions which we believe have general relevance 
to the sociology of cultural work. 
Does our research prompt specific practical recommendations? Certain interviewee comments could, 
potentially, be developed into policy ideas: notably the possibility of longer-term delivery periods and 
greater prioritisation of areas of strategic and infrastructural weakness. However, we have also argued 
that the nature of CoC as a market-oriented placemaking intervention militates against these kinds of 
approaches. This, ultimately, reflects the national-level context, which emphasises the transformative 
capacity of cultural investment in a market-oriented context without addressing the problems of 
insecure work upon which the sector currently depends. 
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